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Contemporary thought, whether it be in 
psychology, biology, immunology, philosophy of 
perception or philosophy of mind, is confronted 
with the breakdown of barriers between organism 
and environment, self and other, subject and object, 
perceiver and perceived. In this paper I show how 
Merleau-Ponty can help us think about this 
problem, by attending to a methodological theme 
in the background of his dialectical conception of 
embodiment. In La structure du comportement, 
Merleau-Ponty conceives life as extension folding 
back upon itself so as to reveal Hegel’s ‘hidden 
mind of nature.’ In the Phénoménologie de la 
perception, radical reflection elucidates the body 
schema as an essence that reveals itself within 
embodied existence, qua shaping the natural 
perceptual dialogue in which the perceiver and the 
perceived permeate and separate from one another. 
In these two conceptions of embodiment, we 
progressively see how the dialectical principle of 
embodiment must reveal and conceive itself within 
embodiment itself. Science, on the other hand, 
follows the phenomena of the body to a certain 
point, but refuses to allow that embodiment is self-
conceptual. I illustrate this using the example of 
dynamic systems theory, an inheritor of the 
tradition of J.J. Gibson’s ecological psychology. In 
this way, I show how Merleau-Ponty’s conception 
of the dialectic of embodiment as self-conceptual is 
important to problems in contemporary thought. 
 
We, you and I, are embodied. This means 
that we are enmeshed in the world. At the 
organic level, we mesh with an 
environment that sustains and denies us. 
We incorporate clothing, tools, rituals, 
language, and our erotic-communicative 
relations to others, into the tissue of habits 
through which we flesh ourselves out. To 
an extent, contemporary science 
recognises that life is a meshing of 
organism and environment, and that mind 
is an embodied, perceptual, social, and 
historical mesh of subject and object. But 
for the most part science fails to explicitly 
comprehend this mesh-work as self-
conceptual. Science may interpret living 
cognition as a self-organising 
phenomenon, but it does so in terms of 
laws and posits that are prior to the living 
individual, since it wants to test its laws by 
experimenting on the individual within an 
already fixed, controlled framework. 
Science, in other words, is committed to 
an a priori that is distinct from the a 
posteriori. It cannot conceive that the 
primordial matrix1 of living cognition is a 
social embodiment that fleshes itself out 
through its own history, and thus stands as 
its own ‘a priori’. 
In this paper I study dynamic 
systems theory, a contemporary program 
in science, to show how this failure to 
explicitly recognise self-conceptual 
phenomena persists, despite science’s 
efforts to break down distinctions between 
organism and environment, and subject 
and object. This is in aid of elucidating a 
root divergence of science and 
phenomenology. (Throughout, “science” 
refers to contemporary experimental 
science, rather than philosophical 
Wissenschaft, even if they turn out to be 
two nodes in one wave of knowledge.)  
In the main, contemporary science is 
anti-phenomenological, contesting the 
specific claims of phenomenology and, 
more important, phenomenological 
method.2 Yet science, like 
phenomenology, comports itself as a 
return to the things themselves, as a 
reduction. For phenomenology, to comport 
oneself in this way is to grasp how one’s 
existence already mires one in an ongoing 
dialogue with things; it is this dialogue 
that guides one’s ‘return.’ 
Phenomenological method as radical just 
is an other-guided ‘return.’ But for 
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science, phenomenology’s reliance on a 
pre-reflective miring in things is 
illegitimate, since this would put the 
beginning of science outside of reason’s 
posits. Science, instead, sails clear of the 
call of things by chaining itself to the 
fixture of its method; moreover, science 
denies that the call of things ever 
compelled it. While phenomenology and 
science are mired in the same straits, their 
relation is one sided: science refuses 
phenomenological argument and method 
from the start; but phenomenology is 
obliged to show how things compel 
science (despite science’s denial of this 
compulsion). This is because 
phenomenology sees that it and science 
are in the same boat, and both could ‘be’ 
phenomenology, since phenomenology, by 
its method, just is that which is 
transformed by the call of things.3 Despite 
this closeness between phenomenology 
and science, phenomenology cannot force 
science to become phenomenology; at 
most, phenomenology can show science 
that it is on the way to phenomenology. 
But science could only be on the way if it 
is already snared by proto-
phenomenological insights. To attend to 
science phenomenologically, then, is to 
show how science is already compelled by 
the call of things, despite its claims to have 
fixed on an a priori framework. And to 
show how science can be compelled by 
this call, yet veer away from it, will reveal 
a root divergence between science and 
phenomenology.  
In what follows I discuss dynamic 
systems theory, in the context of 
methodological issues in the background 
of dialectical conceptions of embodiment 
in La structure du comportement, and 
Phénoménologie de la perception. In 
doing so I show how science since 
Merleau-Ponty’s time is ever more 
compelled by the call of things, yet still 
denies them a self-conceptual status. I 
suggest that this denial is related to issues 
of temporality and the a priori. I thus 
elucidate a root divergence between 
science and phenomenology. Science 
holds off the phenomenology that lurks 
within it by refusing to see things in their 
own time.  
Dynamic systems theory is a recent 
program in psychology. It extends the 
tradition of J.J. Gibson’s ecological 
psychology, by combining Prigogine’s 
chaos theory with various results that 
conceive behaviour as self-organising. For 
example, Nikolai Bernstein’s work in the 
1930’s showed that there is no need to 
posit explicit motor programs that control 
limbs in terms of an external dimensional 
framework. A limb behaves as a spring-
like mass whose intrinsic properties in an 
environment restrict and control its 
possible movements. Turvey and Carello’s 
recent work extends this insight by 
formalising the relevant relations in terms 
of dynamic systems. They show that the 
limb’s behaviour is specified by an 
‘attractor’ of the system. This is to say, 
when various measures of the limb are 
plotted against one another over the course 
of a repeated action, certain relations 
between measures follow roughly the 
same chaotic pattern during each 
repetition—the pattern is not repeated 
exactly, but it has roughly the same shape 
each time, just as no one set of footprints 
cutting across the park falls exactly on top 
of the other, but together the prints 
nonetheless wear out a distinct path. The 
specificity of the attractor, its ‘shape,’ is, 
according to dynamic systems theory, to 
be understood in terms of the properties of 
the limb, and the laws that range over the 
limb-environment system. The attractor is 
not specified by an explicit program built 
into the limb or brain: the attractor is an 
outcome that captures or expresses the 
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complex identity of the limb’s behaviour 
in an environment.  
On this view, we do not control our 
arm by controlling angles at the joints, in 
which case controlling it would amount to 
traversing a given sequence of locations in 
a Cartesian co-ordinate system fixed 
outside the body. Rather, we tense and 
loosen muscles so that when we kick the 
arm into motion, it settles down in the 
right place. Tensing and loosening 
muscles modifies properties of the limb-
environment system so as to specify the 
attractor that will constrain motion so as to 
achieve the desired behaviour. As Turvey 
and Carello suggest, we do not measure 
the location of our arm within a 
dimensional system external to our body; 
rather, doing things with our arm and tools 
“incurs a time-dependent tissue 
deformation pattern” that is constrained by 
the dynamics of the arm-environment 
system, and is “expressed in the intrinsic 
co-ordinate system defined by the muscles 
and tendons” in the arm.4 Location and 
control of our arm is to be understood in 
terms of co-ordinates that are expressed 
within the arm-environment system itself, 
and not in terms of abstract co-ordinate 
systems. We thus use our bodies and the 
world to shape our own movements, rather 
than dealing with our bodies as it were 
from the outside. ‘Just as’ the tightrope 
walker’s pole is intrinsic to her balance, 
damping out jitters and shakes, the weight, 
density, mass distribution and resilience of 
our limbs in our environment, which can 
be modified by muscle contractions, 
specify ‘attractors’ ‘within’ the limb-
environment system that hold our motions 
to certain patterns. 
This conception of limb movement 
in some ways makes the same points that 
Merleau-Ponty does in the 
Phénoménologie. The movement of the 
arm is a continuous, internally related 
whole that already links body and world, 
and I do not need to plot my arm’s 
trajectory when I move it.5 Dynamic 
systems theory, in other words, is 
compelled by the same sort of phenomena 
that Merleau-Ponty elucidates. But let us 
turn to Structure to see how dynamic 
systems theory fails to grasp the 
temporality and identity of our 
embodiment. The attractor that governs 
the arm’s behaviour is a contemporary 
cognate of the Gestalt, so far as it 
conceives behaviour in terms of overall 
dynamic relations between the organism 
and the environment. Since the attractor is 
to be conceived in terms of relations that 
range over the entirety of the organism-
environment system, dynamic systems 
theory seems to avoid the temptation of 
the Gestaltists that Merleau-Ponty so often 
criticises, namely, to interpret Gestalten in 
terms of component physical causes that 
are external to one another.  
This temptation is misguided 
because Gestalten of organisms are 
inseparable from the existence of the 
organism. We must recognise that the law 
of falling bodies manifests an idea, since it 
is only our antecedent effort to articulate 
ideas in the cosmos that guides us in 
isolating gravity as a distinct force visible 
in bodies that nowhere behave ideally.6 
Even more, we must recognise an idea in 
an organismic Gestalt, since it is only the 
organism’s effort to articulate itself out of 
its environment that allows us to elucidate 
its Gestalt. While falling bodies never 
themselves exemplify the idea of a falling 
body, an organism just is the 
exemplification of its idea, although the 
organism is not explicitly conscious of 
this. Separable component physical causes 
precisely vanish within this living idea, 
only becoming explicitly distinct when the 
living behaviour of the organism breaks 
down.7 As Merleau-Ponty writes in the La 
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structure du comportement, “l’objet de la 
biologie est impensable sans les unités de 
signification qu’une conscience y trouve et 
voit s’y déployer.”8 For this reason we 
must understand life as appearing when 
extension folds back upon itself in such a 
way as to internally unite causal 
components within an overall structure 
whose behaviour expresses its internal 
unity, its idea, in outer form, thus 
revealing a Hegelian ‘esprit caché de la 
nature.’9 Distinct causal components 
vanish within this fold, and this folding of 
extension qua a living being thus specifies 
a structure, a “jonction d’une idée et d’une 
existence indiscernables.” 10 Idea and 
existence are indiscernible in an 
organismic structure since this idea can 
only be found in the existence of the 
organism, and the existence of the 
organism is its outward realisation of its 
inner idea. 
By Turvey’s own account, dynamic 
systems theory diverges from Gestalt 
theory so far as it conceives the attractor 
as ‘falling out’ of ecological laws that 
range over the organism and the 
environment. It construes these ecological 
laws as holonomic constraints on the 
system, that is, as constraints specified by 
the totality of all levels of laws that range 
across the system, rather than by distinct 
causes that abstractly represent factors in 
the organism’s environment.11 A digital 
thermostat, for example, would, according 
to Turvey, be non-holonomic, since it uses 
its lawful substratum (the properties of 
silicon, etc.) to represent its environment 
in discrete states, where the discreteness of 
these states and its representational 
function abstracts from the physical laws 
of the substratum. An analog thermostat, 
made with a bi-metallic strip, would be 
holonomic, since the curvature of the strip 
is directly regulative of the thermostat, and 
the behaviour of the thermostat is thus 
directly specifiable in terms of the totality 
of laws that govern the system of which 
the thermostat is a part, without invoking 
any explicit representational function. To 
translate into the terminology of 
Phénoménologie, the digital thermostat 
measures a ready-made dimension of 
temperature that is logically external to the 
substratum in which this temperature is 
represented—it is not the temperature of 
the silicon that controls the thermostat, but 
electrical states that encode temperature; 
whereas the analog thermostat does not 
posit such a ready-made world, since its 
states are inseparable from the physical 
domain whose temperature they regulate. 
The digital thermostat buys into an outside 
idea of temperature, whereas by 
preferentially responding to its 
environment the analog thermostat 
‘expresses’ the idea of a temperature that 
already is within that environment. 
Dynamic systems theory, then, 
conceives attractors as an outcome that 
‘falls out of’ holonomic laws that range 
over the organism-environment system. It 
does not posit the organism as living in a 
ready-made world that the organism 
represents, but as being of its environment. 
To this extent, dynamic systems theory 
recognises that the organism-environment 
relation specifies a unique idea inseparable 
from its existence and realisation in the 
organism. The relation is not reducible to 
more abstract terms and cannot be 
specified in abstraction from the existence 
of the organism.  
Dynamic systems theory, however, 
proceeds to construe the ecological law of 
the organism in terms of more basic laws 
of the physical domain, and thus loses 
sight of the organism-environment relation 
as specifying an irreducible dialectic. That 
is, it tacitly conceives the organism as 
built out of more basic laws, rather than 
acknowledging that if the holonomic laws 
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that specify the dynamic system range 
over the organism and the environment, 
the organism must be conceived as 
building itself out of its own law, since 
there would be no such ecological laws 
without the actual existence of the 
organism. In the language of Structure, 
dynamic systems theory fails to recognise 
that the organism’s law is in fact a norm, 
that the folding back of matter onto itself 
in a living unity specifies an irreducible 
dialectic. Dynamic systems theory puts its 
own a priori ideal posits before the self-
normalising existence of the individual 
organism, since that is the only way it can 
give an account of the objective 
emergence of the organism. It thus fails to 
acknowledge that the recognition of 
ecological laws entails recognition of the 
fact that the organism is the judge of its 
own objective grounds, that it is, in 
Hegel’s terms, (implicitly) a self-
conceptual syllogism. 
Although the above analysis takes up the 
example of the human arm, it treats the 
arm in terms of merely vital behaviour, 
that is, it treats it on an organic level, in 
abstraction from the totality of the 
perceptual field and being in the world. 
The fact that dynamic systems theory 
veers away from the self-conceptuality of 
the phenomenon becomes clearer if we 
shift to a treatment of the full human 
dimension of motor-perceptual behaviour. 
So let me try and deepen the above by 
shifting into the world of perception, away 
from a discussion of the vital order in La 
structure du comportement, to a discussion 
of the body schema in Phénoménologie de 
la perception.  
Starting from a concept of limb 
movement and control similar to the one 
discussed above, in a recent (1994) work 
Thelen and Smith argue that the 
development of reaching in infants is 
specified by attractors that emerge through 
the history of dynamic relations between 
the infant and the environment.12 The 
methodology of dynamic systems theory 
leads Thelen and Smith to argue that “the 
individual and his or her behavioural 
changes over time are the fundamental 
unit of study.”13 That is, if we are to 
understand the attractors that shape 
reaching, we have to follow the 
development of humans as individuals, 
rather than thinking that the development 
of reaching is governed, for example, by 
innate motor programs that are common to 
all individuals in virtue of their neural 
makeup. Thelen and Smith therefore 
present a richly detailed study of the 
mechanics of the development of reaching 
in several individual infants. They show 
how reaching develops in quite different 
ways in different infants, and at the same 
time show how, from the point of view of 
science, dynamic systems theory helps 
explain the individual phenomena.  
In a given situation, they argue, the 
infant has the goal of reaching for the 
object. Given the infant’s physiognomy, 
its history and the physical laws that 
constrain the infant-environment relation, 
the individual infant has certain attractors 
that support and constrain the dynamics of 
her or his reaching. For each infant, 
reaching requires a solution to the problem 
posed by using her or his bodily dynamics 
to achieve the goal of reaching. Thelen 
and Smith are trying to show that the 
development of reaching does not depend 
on innate motor programs, or 
representations of the environment, but 
that development is played out within the 
dynamics of the infant-environment 
relation, and on this kinesiological count 
their argument is successful. But their 
account of development has two signal 
features: it ends up interpreting the 
behaviours of the infant in terms of lower 
level laws that the infant-environment 
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system is ‘built out of,’ since the ‘choices’ 
open to the infant are specified by these 
laws; and their account requires, as Thelen 
and Smith acknowledge, that the infant 
already be driven toward a goal. On the 
latter point Thelen and Smith try to show 
that the goal of the infant ultimately stems 
from the brain qua a dynamic neural 
system that evolves more refined goals 
from less refined goals, in the manner of 
Edelman’s theory of neuronal group 
selection, albeit the brain is lodged in an 
embodied, situated developing infant. 
Nonetheless, Thelen and Smith interpret 
behaviours that are played out through 
ecological laws that range over the infant 
and environment in terms of lower level 
laws that remain distinct from each other. 
While they argue that the object of study 
must be the individual, they decompose 
the individual into component laws in 
order to explain his or her behaviour, and 
thus abstract from the problems posed by 
the world to the individual within her or 
his history. 
Here we can shift to the concept of 
the body schema in Phénoménologie de la 
perception. I argue that we should 
understand the body schema as the 
primordial habit-matrix of the body. In 
virtue of the body schema, we comport 
ourselves toward the world in an 
anticipatory manner such that our 
explorations constitute a motor-perceptual 
synthesis that co-synthesises the body and 
the world in one act of “co-naissance.”14 
The body schema is, in other words, the 
principle of the natural perceptual dialogue 
in which the world and body permeate and 
separate from one another—enmesh and 
‘give birth’ to one another’s perceptual 
identities—through their 
interpermeation.15 This entails that the 
lived body is “une unité expressive,”16 “un 
noeud de significations vivantes et non pas 
la loi d’un certain nombre de termes 
covariants.”17 The connection between the 
body schema and the lived body is not like 
that between the idea of a circle and a 
circle,18 because the body schema 
inseparably is its expression in the lived 
body, it is an essence in existence. 
Methodologically, then, the body schema 
is revealed by radical reflection that 
discerns the a priori not through pure 
reflection, but by making explicit the tacit 
logic of the fact that experience is “la 
communication d’un sujet fini avec un être 
opaque d’où il émerge mais où il reste 
engagé.”19 The permeating-separation 
entailed by the fact of such an experience 
is precisely what leads us to elucidate a 
body schema, a pre-personal ‘principle’ in 
virtue of which this permeating-separation 
is always already underway as a ‘co-birth’ 
of body and world. To say that the body 
schema is an a priori of the lived body is 
thus precisely to say that it is self-
conceptual, since the expressive unity of 
which the body schema is the principle 
gives us our experience of the lived body 
in the first place, and it is this expressive 
unity that leads us to elucidate the body 
schema. Finally, Merleau-Ponty’s remarks 
about perceptual learning, for example, 
about the learning of new colours, suggest 
that such learning is an unfurling of the a 
priori of embodiment, and amounts to the 
formation of a new organ of the lived 
body.20 Perceptual development, in other 
words, is not to be understood in terms of 
externally ordered time, but in terms of 
habit and personal history. The body 
schema, then, is a new sort of a priori, it is 
a pre-personal past of embodiment, and 
when radical reflection seeks this new a 
priori, it seeks the unreflective fund of its 
own experience, “une passé originel, une 
passé qui n’a jamais été présent.”21 This 
original past is the proper self-conceptual 
ground of the lived body, the one that 
phenomenology ‘returns’ to.  
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When Thelen and Smith discern an 
attractor in the infant-environment system 
qua accounting for the development of 
reaching, they are discerning a cognate of 
the body schema. The attractor is a 
principle of infant-environment relations 
that is irreducible, since it governs its own 
unfolding through the history of its 
individual dynamics. However, they 
interpret this principle in terms of lower 
level dynamics and laws, thus prescinding 
from the dynamics and temporality that 
this attractor itself establishes, and seeing 
distinct lower levels of constraint as 
shaping higher level unities. Instead of 
engaging in a radical reflection that 
unpacks an a priori intrinsic within a 
given self-conceptual, self-expressive 
unity, they give an account of it in terms 
of an a priori that belongs to a different 
time order, namely that posited by 
scientific cognition in its objective 
conception of physical systems. On the 
one hand, dynamic systems theory asks us 
to attend to entities that emerge within 
processes, and asks us to attend to 
individuals, thus getting past science’s 
urge to appeal to rock-bottom posits that 
are ‘objective’ (in science’s understanding 
of the term), that is, outside the ambit of 
any phenomena that present themselves as 
self-conceptual. But dynamic systems 
theory nonetheless veers away from the 
individual by seeking to account for it in 
terms of such rock-bottom posits. This 
tension is explicit in Thelen and Smith’s 
account, since they acknowledge that a full 
account of the development of reaching 
would have to attend to the social 
dimensions of reaching, that is, to 
meanings that emerge within the history of 
the human individual as such, meanings 
that are irreducible to causal processes 
within an ahistorical time order. Yet 
Thelen and Smith consistently head into 
ahistorical time, explaining reaching in 
terms of muscle and tendon, nerves and 
senses, since perhaps they cannot see how 
a self-conceptual system could get itself 
going as always already self-conceptual. 
They cannot see how there could be an 
‘esprit caché’ of nature—if mind reveals 
itself in nature through a development, it is 
because non-mindful laws build up into 
mindful ones, it could not be the case that 
mind has always already conceived itself.  
On the other hand, in another study 
Fogel suggests that the development of 
reaching must be understood in terms of 
the ways in which adult bodies and 
reaching provide ‘scaffolding’ for the 
development of reaching in infants.22 Here 
we see a way in which reaching could a 
priori be self-conceptual, since the adult’s 
reach already expresses the element that it 
discovers as irreducible in the full fledged 
self-conceptual phenomenon of infant 
reaching—the adult’s reach grasps the 
infant’s wanting-to-reach, and thus draws 
out the infant reach into a full fledged 
expression of reaching. Following this 
thought would take us into flesh. 
But let us return to the methodological 
level. Above we have seen that dynamic 
systems theory encounters an irreducible 
unity in the phenomenon—it is called by 
things that demand that their essences be 
recognised as inseparable from their 
existence in their situation. Yet science 
denies this, since its drive is to interpret 
the phenomenon in terms of causal 
constraints that have distinct identities 
outside of the self-organising history of 
the phenomenon. We can give two 
interpretations of the motives for this 
move.  
First, in its aim for objectivity and 
the third person perspective, science must 
give its accounts in terms of absolute a 
priori posits that stand outside the first 
person perspective. Science cannot grasp 
Merleau-Ponty’s conception of an a priori 
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that belongs to living existence itself, prior 
to scientific reflection, prior to all 
reflection. Science takes the a priori 
posited by science as first in the 
conceptual order of explanation, whereas 
phenomenology grasps the a priori 
intrinsic to the existence of self-conceptual 
phenomena as first in the conceptual order 
of description. However, insofar as science 
recognises that self-conceptual, 
dynamically self-organising phenomena 
are to be explained, science has implicitly 
made the move toward phenomenology. It 
has been snared by the call of things, 
become mired in them. Science has to 
follow through on this by seeing that this 
recognition already tacitly conceives a 
new sort of a priori, the a priori of self-
conceptual phenomena. 
Second, I would like to suggest that 
we can interpret this in terms of time. 
Dynamic systems theory makes its main 
advances over prior science by attending 
to the dynamic dimension of living 
phenomena. Indeed, if we trace the history 
of dynamic systems theory back to the 
work of Bernstein, we find that 
Bernstein’s advances depended on his 
techniques for measuring the living body, 
rather than the corpse, and for measuring 
the body in motion, that is, for measuring 
the body in its own time. Thelen and 
Smith take this one step further by asking 
us to attend to various time scales of 
development within the individual’s 
history. Yet they consistently turn from the 
internally unified temporality of the 
individual to the extrinsically ordered time 
of physiology and physics, they turn from 
the body’s own time to exterior time. This 
leads to my concluding suggestion that to 
truly attend to the longitudinal 
development of the individual requires a 
conception of an a priori intrinsic to that 
development, within the lived body’s own 
time. This is precisely the sort of a priori 
that Merleau-Ponty discovers within the 
lived body and in the self-articulation of 
fleshy being. To return to the call of things 
is to be guided by one’s existence in the 
flesh, and this is to dwell in the spread and 
gather of its time and place. 
Notes
                                                          
1 My use of the word “matrix” is taken 
from Casey’s work (cf. Casey 1993; Casey 
1997). 
2 Cf., e.g., Dennett’s discussion of 
heterophenomenology in Dennett 1991, 
which is notably inaccurate about 
phenomenology. (See Thompson 1995 and 
Pessoa, Thompson, and Noë 
(Forthcoming) for a criticism.) 
3 Cf. Leder’s argument that 
phenomenology must show why bodily 
phenomena motivate Cartesian dualism, 
even if phenomenology puts Cartesian 
dualism into question (Leder 1990).  
4 Turvey and Carello 1995, p 478. Here I 
am generalising from Turvey and 
Carello’s point. 
5 Cf., e.g., Merleau-Ponty 1945 (hereafter 
PdlP), 162-166; Merleau-Ponty 1962 
(hereafter PP), 135-142. 
6 Cf. Merleau-Ponty 1942 (hereafter SdC), 
147-157; Merleau-Ponty 1965 (hereafter 
SB), 137-145. 
7 Cf. SdC, 157-173; SB 145-160. On these 
issues about the organism, also see 
Goldstein 1995, the earlier discussions in 
Russon 1997, and Varela 1991. 
8 SdC, 175SB, 161. 
9 SdC, 175; SB, 161-162. 
10 SdC, 223; SB, 206. 
11 Turvey 1992, 110-111. 
12 Thelen and Smith 1994. 
13 Thelen and Smith 1994, 33, their italics. 
14 Cf. Merleau-Ponty’s argument that the 
subject of sensation is “une puissance qui 
co-naît à un certain milieu d’existence ou 
se syncronise avec lui” (PdlP, 245; PP, 
211, emphasis mine); compare the same 
word play in SdC 213, where Merleau-
Ponty attributes the play to Claudel. 
8 
                                                                                                                                                                      
15 On this role of the body schema in 
perception see Lingis’s excellent but 
enigmatic “The Body Postured and 
Dissolute,” in Lingis 1996. 
16 PdlP, 239; PP, 206. 
17 PdlP, 177; PP, 151. 
18 Cf. PdlP 175, 239; PP 150, 206. 
19 PdlP, 253; PP, 219. 
20 Cf. PdlP, 38, 179; PP, 29-30, 153. 
21 PdlP 280, PP 242. 
22 Fogel 1993. 
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